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THE PBGC WINS A CASE WHENEVER THE DEBTOR
KEEPS ITS PENSION PLAN
Israel Goldowitz*, Garth Wilson, Erin Kim, and Kirsten
Bender
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federal
agency charged with insuring private-sector defined benefit
pension plans, has long had a prominent role in corporate
bankruptcies. PBGC focuses its effort on the continuation of
pension plans, in true reorganizations and in sales of businesses.
To this end, ERISA has made it more difficult for a sponsor to
terminate a plan in its own economic interest. For example, a
sponsor’s latitude to terminate an underfunded plan was limited
to circumstances involving the sponsor’s financial distress.
Likewise, the termination premium, which was added to ERISA
in recent years, is an obligation that survives bankruptcy and it
may help to deter some unwarranted terminations.
Unfortunately, in some cases, PBGC must seek plan termination,
and PBGC then seeks to maximize its recoveries. These are blunt
tools, however, and the case law has further dulled them. With
plan continuation the preferred outcome, PBGC succeeds in its
statutory mission whenever a sponsor emerges from bankruptcy
with its pension plan ongoing.

Mr. Goldowitz is Chief Counsel of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and
an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University Law Center. Mr. Wilson is an
Assistant Chief Counsel and Ms. Kim and Ms. Bender are attorneys with PBGC.
Any opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ own, and do not represent the
views of the PBGC or any other organization. The authors gratefully acknowledge
the assistance of Michelle Li, Paralegal Specialist, PBGC. The authors also
gratefully acknowledge the comments of James Armbruster, Christopher Bone,
Charles Finke, John Ginsberg, John Hanley, Karen Morris, Bruce Perlin, Neela
Ranade, Nathaniel Rayle, and Gail Sevin.
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INTRODUCTION

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC or the
Corporation) is the federal agency charged with insuring
private-sector defined benefit pension plans. In carrying out its
statutory mission, PBGC devotes much of its day-to-day
attention to financially troubled plan sponsors who are either in
bankruptcy or may enter bankruptcy.
Part I of this paper discusses the statutory framework
governing the pension insurance system with a focus on PBGC’s
purpose and powers, termination of defined benefit pension
plans, PBGC payment of benefits, and employer liability to
PBGC. Part II is a primer on certain key bankruptcy concepts
that apply to business reorganizations or liquidations and to the
rights of creditors. Part III addresses PBGC’s experience in
bankruptcy, including some important judicial decisions that, for
better or for worse, are part of the legal framework in which
PBGC operates.
II.

TITLE IV BASICS

A. OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION
1. History, Purpose, and Operation of the Corporation
Before 1974, the process for terminating a defined benefit
pension plan was relatively unregulated.1 Notably, an employer
had no obligation to make up the funding shortfall after a plan
was terminated.2
As a result, companies facing financial
difficulty could simply walk away from their pension liabilities,
leaving participants without the retirement income promised to
them.3 It took a major crisis—the termination of the Studebaker
Corporation pension plan in 1963, in which 4,000 auto workers
lost some or all of their pension benefits—to prompt Congress to
act.4

1. See JEFFREY LEWIS ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 9-3 (3rd ed. 2012)
[hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW].
2. Id. at 9-5–9-6.
3. Id.
4. History of PBGC, PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are/pg/history-
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PBGC was established by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).5 It is a wholly-owned United
States government corporation, and the federal agency charged
with administering the termination insurance program under
Title IV of ERISA.6 The Corporation is governed by a Board of
Directors composed of three members: the Secretary of Labor,
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce.7
Daily operations are overseen by the Director, who is nominated
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
serves a five-year term at the pleasure of the President and the
Board of Directors.8
Congress declared Title IV to have three purposes to be
carried out by PBGC:
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of
voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of
their participants,
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted
payment of pension benefits to participants and
beneficiaries under plans to which [Title IV]
applies, and
(3) to maintain premiums established by the
corporation . . . at the lowest level consistent with
carrying out its obligation under [Title IV].9
In furtherance of these purposes, PBGC has the authority to
adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations;10 to exercise administrative
subpoena powers;11 to “sue and be sued” in its own name;12 and
to litigate disputes “through its own counsel” before all domestic
courts and tribunals.13
of-pbgc.html (last visited May 8, 2015).
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2012)).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); see also id. § 1302(b) (providing that “the
corporation has the powers conferred on a nonprofit corporation under the District of
Colombia Nonprofit Corporation Act”), “Title IV” is the popular name of Subchapter
III of Chapter 18 of Title 29 of the United States Code. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1).
8. Id. § 1302(a), (c); WILLIAM G. BEYER, ET AL., ABI’S PENSION MANUAL: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PENSION ISSUES ARISING IN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY CASES 22
(Carol Connor Flowe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter BEYER].
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1)-(3).
10. Id. § 1302(b)(3).
11. Id. § 1303(a); BEYER, supra note 8, at 22.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1).
13. Id.; BEYER, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that PBGC’s independent litigating
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PBGC does not receive any general federal revenue to fund
its insurance program.14 Instead, its operations are funded by
premiums, assets from terminated plans trusteed by PBGC,
recoveries from firms formerly responsible for the plans, and
investment income.15 PBGC’s annual premiums, both flat-rate
and variable-rate, are collected from plan sponsors in amounts
fixed by Congress.16 In fiscal year 2014, PBGC derived $3.9
billion in revenue from premium collections.17 Although the
payment of premiums is required by law,18 a plan sponsor’s
failure to pay premiums will not result in the loss of PBGC’s
guarantee for basic benefits.19
2. Title IV Coverage
PBGC does not insure all pension plans. Within the
universe of employer-sponsored retirement plans, PBGC insures
only benefits of private-sector, defined benefit pension plans
subject to Title IV of ERISA.20 To be covered under Title IV, a
plan must: (1) be an “employee pension benefit plan;” (2) be
established or maintained by an employer, employee
organization representing employees, or both, engaged in
commerce or industries affecting commerce; and (3) meet taxqualification standards under the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC).21 A plan is generally deemed to meet the tax-qualification
requirement if it has received a favorable determination from
the Internal Revenue Service.22
Certain plans are expressly excluded from coverage under

authority, “together with a broad grant of settlement authority, permits it to act
independently and quickly without the multiple layers of government concurrences
other agencies may need to work within”).
14. 2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 20, available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2014annual-report.pdf; see also BEYER, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that “PBGC was
designed to be financially self-sustaining and receives no funds from general tax
revenues”).
15. 2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 20, supra note 14; see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW,
supra note 1, at 3-31 (describing sources of PBGC’s funding and its investment
authority).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1307.
17. 2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 88, supra note 14.
18. 2 9 U.S.C. § 1307.
19. Id. § 1307(d).
20. See id. § 1321.
21. See id. § 1321(a) (providing two alternative statutory tests a plan must meet
or have met to be covered under Title IV).
22. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-7–9-8.
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Title IV and therefore not protected by PBGC’s guarantee.23
Among these exceptions are “individual account plans,”24
“governmental plans,”25 and “church plans.”26
Thus, for
example, PBGC does not cover defined contribution plans,
including “401(k) plans.”27 PBGC also does not cover plans that
are established and maintained by the federal government, or
any state or municipality.28 Also, it does not cover plans for
employees of a church or church-affiliated hospital, school, or
other organization unless the organization has elected to comply
with the participation, vesting, and funding requirements of
ERISA and the IRC.29
3. Types of Plans Covered
PBGC maintains two separate insurance programs: a
single-employer program and a multiemployer program.30
Single-employer plans are the more numerous.31 Simply
defined as “a plan which is not a multiemployer plan,”32 a singleemployer plan is established and maintained by one employer
(or a group of employers under common ownership) for the
benefit of its employees.33 A multiple-employer plan, a subset of

23. See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (enumerating 13 statutory exceptions to Title IV
coverage).
24. Id. § 1321(b)(1); see also id. § 1002(34) (defining term “individual account
plan” to mean “a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the
participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains, and losses, and any
forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such
participant’s account”).
25. Id. § 1321(b)(2).
26. Id. § 1321(b)(3); see also 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) (2012) (defining term “church
plan” to mean “a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees (or their
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of churches which is
exempt from tax under [IRC] section 501”).
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(34), 1321(b).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2).
29. See id. § 1321(b)(3).
30. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-6.
31. See 2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 5, supra note 14 (reporting that in 2014 PBGC’s
“single-employer program protect[ed] about 31 million workers and retirees in over
22,000 pension plans” while the “multiemployer program protect[ed] about 10 million
workers and retirees in about 1,400 pension plans”).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(41).
33. See Glossary, PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about/pg/header/glossary.html#S
(last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
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single-employer plans,34 is sponsored by more than one
unrelated employer, but is not maintained under a collective
bargaining agreement.35 PBGC has the authority to terminate,
take over as statutory trustee, and insure the benefits of singleemployer pension plans covered under Title IV.36
Multiemployer plans are maintained under collective
bargaining agreements “between one or more employee
organizations and more than one employer.”37 Commonly known
as a Taft-Hartley plan, a multiemployer pension plan is
administered by a board of trustees made up of an equal number
of management and labor appointees.38 Unlike single-employer
plans, PBGC does not terminate and trustee multiemployer
plans facing financial distress.39 Rather, PBGC for decades has
provided financial assistance in the form of loans to insolvent
plans to enable them to pay benefits to the guarantee limit.40 In
2014, faced with deepening financial distress in a minority of
plans, potentially jeopardizing the solvency of the multiemployer
insurance program, Congress enacted new legislation.41 Those
amendments, among other topics, are briefly summarized in the
next section.
4. Minimum Funding Standards, “Downsizing” and
Withdrawal Liability, and Tools to Address Risk from
Certain Deeply Troubled Multiemployer Plans
Single-employer pension plans subject to Title IV of ERISA
are required to maintain funding levels in accordance with

34. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-54.
35. COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 33 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter MEDILL].
36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1341, 1342.
37. Id. § 1002(37)(A).
38. See id. § 186(c)(5); see also MEDILL, supra note 35, at 33.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341a.
40. See id. § 1431. The multiemployer guarantee limit is 100% of the first $11
of the accrual rate, plus 75% of the next $33, times years of credited service, or
$35.75 per month per year of service. The maximum guarantee amount is sometimes
summarized as $12,870 per year with 30 years of service. Benefit improvements less
than five years old are not guaranteed at all. Id. § 1322a(a)-(c); Multiemployer
Insurance Plan Facts, PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about/factsheets/page/multifacts.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
41. See Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 [hereinafter MPRA], Pub. L.
No. 113-235, Div. O, 128 Stat. 2130, 2773 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
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statutory standards.42 These provisions are mainly set forth in
the IRC.43 In general, a plan sponsor must annually make a
minimum required contribution to its pension plan.44 The
sponsor’s minimum required contribution for a plan year
“generally depends on a comparison of the value of the plan’s
assets with the plan’s funding target and target normal cost.”45
The “funding target” for the plan year is defined as “the present
value of all benefits accrued or earned under the plan as of the
beginning of the plan year.”46 The term “target normal cost” for
a plan year loosely means the present value of all benefits
expected to be earned in the plan year plus the amount of planrelated expenses expected to be paid in the plan year.47
Additional funding may be required if the plan’s poor funding
status causes it to be deemed “at-risk.”48 Funding rules are
complex and a pension actuary must certify the required
contribution.49 Pension liability (the funding target) is inversely
related to the assumed interest rate at which future benefits are
discounted.50 Since the minimum required funding contribution
is directly related to the funding target, the lower the assumed
interest rate, the greater the funding burden.
Congress provided PBGC with one important tool to enforce
the minimum funding requirements for single-employer pension
plans covered under Title IV. If a plan sponsor fails to make a
required contribution and the aggregate unpaid balance of
missed contributions exceeds $1 million, then the plan sponsor
must report the delinquency to PBGC.51 A lien in the amount of
the aggregate unpaid balance arises in favor of the pension plan
on all property of the plan sponsor and members of its
“controlled group.”52 PBGC has sole authority to perfect and
enforce this lien.53
Congress provided PBGC with one other tool to shore up
42. See 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2012).
43. See id.; see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 5-62.
44. See 26 U.S.C. § 430(a) (defining the term “minimum required contribution”).
45. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
H.R. 4, THE “PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006” 9 (Aug. 3, 2006).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 430(d)(1).
47. See id. § 430(b).
48. See id. § 430(i).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id. § 430(k)(4)(A).
52. Id. § 430(k)(1). The concept of “controlled group” is discussed below.
53. Id. § 430(k)(5).
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ongoing single-employer plans. This provision, which may be
viewed as kind of “downsizing” liability, was amended in 2014.54
The amended statute is much more intricate in its definitions
and exemptions than the original, but generally it imposes
liability in the event of a workforce reduction of sufficient size
caused by a permanent cessation of operations at a facility.55
Subject to certain exceptions, liability is triggered by a workforce
reduction of more than 15% of the total number of employees
who are eligible to participate in any employee pension benefit
plan (including a 401(k) plan) maintained by the employer.56
This provision cross-references another that addresses
withdrawals from multiple-employer plans, which requires the
employer to furnish a bond or escrow to secure liability in the
event of termination.57 Alternatively, the employer may elect to
satisfy its liability by contributing an amount equal to the plan’s
“unfunded vested benefits” (using a funding-target measure) in
seven annual installments.58
The funding rules governing multiemployer plans differ
considerably
from
those
for
single-employer
plans.
Multiemployer plans enjoy more discretion in the choice of
actuarial funding methods and assumptions.59 Contribution
rates for employers are established by collective bargaining
agreements.60 The plan must establish a “funding standard
account,” to which specified charges and credits are made each
year.61 If the total charges to the funding standard account are
greater than the total credits, there is a funding “deficiency.”62
Generally, this will obligate employers to make additional
contributions beyond the amounts required by their collective
54. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 [hereinafter
CFCAA], Pub. L. No. 113-235, Div. P, 128 Stat. 2130, 2822 (2014) (to be codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1362(e)).
55. Id. at § 1(a).
56. Id.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1363 (2012).
58. CFCAA, Div. P, § 1(a), 128 Stat. at 2822. The obligation to pay additional
annual installments may cease if plan funding meets a certain threshold. Id.
59. See DAN M. MCGILL, KYLE N. BROWN, JOHN J. HALEY, SYLVESTER J.
SCHIEBER & MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 638-39
(9th ed. 2010) [hereinafter MCGILL].
60. PBGC, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AND DEP’T OF LABOR, Multiemployer
Pension Plans Report to Congress Required by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, at
25 (Jan. 22, 2013), http://pbgc.gov/documents/pbgc-report-multiemployer-pensionplans.pdf [hereinafter MULTIEMPLOYER REPORT].
61. 26 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2012).
62. Id.
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bargaining agreements.63
The financial well-being of multiemployer plans also
depends on collection of “withdrawal liability.”
When an
employer withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer plan, a
statutory obligation is triggered called withdrawal liability.
Withdrawal liability is a duty requiring the employer to continue
funding its share of the shortfall.64
Withdrawal liability
represents the employer’s share of “unfunded vested benefits”
and is determined under the method elected by the plan.65 The
plan is responsible for determining and collecting withdrawal
liability.66
As mentioned above, in 2014 Congress gave certain deeply
troubled multiemployer plans new tools intended to reduce
systemic risk to participants and the multiemployer insurance
program. In a complex set of statutory amendments, Congress
gave multiemployer plans in “critical and declining” status
authority to “suspend” benefit payments, subject to certain
limitations (e.g., affecting benefits to participants over age 80 or
based on disability).67 Benefit suspensions are subject to specific
conditions and require an application to the Department of the
Treasury (which is to consult with PBGC) and a participant
ratification vote.68 These provisions built on concepts added to
the statute in 2006. The latter called for multiemployer plans in
“endangered” and “critical” status to adopt funding improvement
or rehabilitation plans that could include reductions of future
accruals and, for plans in critical status, suspensions of early
retirement subsidies and ancillary benefits, and restrictions on
lump-sum distributions.69
In addition, the 2014 amendments revamped PBGC’s
authority to approve a “partition” of a plan in “critical and
declining” status, provided that the plan has taken all
reasonable measures to avoid insolvency, including maximum
benefit suspensions.70 In essence, partition enables the old plan
63. MULTIEMPLOYER REPORT, supra note 60, at 27.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (withdrawal liability); id. § 1383 (complete
withdrawals); id. § 1385 (partial withdrawals).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381(b)(1), 1391; MULTIEMPLOYER REPORT, supra note 60, at
19.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1382.
67. MPRA, Div. O § 201(a)(6), 128 Stat. at 2798 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
432(e) and 29 U.S.C. § 1085(e)).
68. Id.
69. See 26 U.S.C. § 432 (2012).
70. MPRA, Div. O § 122(a), 128 Stat. at 2795 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1413).
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to transfer certain liabilities to a new, insolvent plan that will
receive financial assistance from PBGC, whereas the old plan
will be placed on a stronger financial footing going forward.
Both the plan created by PBGC’s partition order and the old
plan will have the same private-sector administration as
before.71
The rest of this paper will largely focus on PBGC and
single-employer plans.
5. PBGC’s Guarantee and Limitations
At the heart of Title IV’s pension insurance program is
PBGC’s benefit guarantee. Subject to important limitations,
PBGC guarantees the payment of “all nonforfeitable benefits
(other than benefits becoming nonforfeitable solely on account of
the termination of a plan) under a single-employer plan which
terminates at a time when [Title IV] applies to it.”72 PBGC’s
regulations provide that it
will guarantee the amount, as of the termination date,
of a benefit provided under a plan . . . if: (1) The benefit
is, on the termination date, a nonforfeitable benefit; (2)
The benefit qualifies as a pension benefit as defined in
[29 C.F.R.] § 4022.2; and (3) The participant is entitled
to the benefit under [29 C.F.R.] § 4022.4.73
The term “nonforfeitable benefit” has a precise statutory
definition, but it loosely refers to a benefit for which the
participant satisfied the plan’s vesting requirements before
termination.74 The term “pension benefit” is defined as “a
benefit payable as an annuity, or one or more payments related
thereto, to a participant who permanently leaves or has
permanently left covered employment. . . .”75 Therefore, PBGC
does not guarantee health and welfare benefits, or certain lumpsum death benefits even if such benefits are promised under a
plan subject to Title IV.76
The two principal limitations on PBGC’s guarantee are set

71. See id.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2012).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 4022.3(a) (2014).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(8).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 4022.2.
76. Guaranteed
Benefits,
PBGC
(Feb.
https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits.html.

17,

2015),
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forth in the statute.77 The first is referred to in PBGC’s
regulations as the “maximum guaranteeable benefit.”78 It is
described as the maximum monthly benefit provided by a plan
that may be guaranteed, with the maximum determined using
an “actuarial value.”79 The reference to “actuarial value” means,
for example, that the maximum guarantee is reduced for those
who begin to receive benefits from PBGC before age 65, because
they will receive benefits for a longer time than if their benefits
began at 65.80 For a plan that terminates during 2015, the
maximum monthly guarantee for a retiree aged 65 is
$5,011.36.81
The second principal limitation is known informally as the
“phase-in limit.” It provides for a phase-in of PBGC’s guarantee
of any benefit increase adopted or effective (whichever is later)
during the five-year period before a plan terminates.82 The
guarantee is phased in at the rate of 20% of the amount of the
increase (or $20 per month, if greater) for each year the increase
has been in effect.83 For example, if a participant’s monthly
benefit was increased by $200 as a result of a plan amendment
effective two years before termination, PBGC guarantees $80 of
that increase.84
6. PBGC Payment of Nonguaranteed Benefits
PBGC pays guaranteed benefits, described above,
regardless of the plan’s funded level.85 If the benefits under a
plan are not fully guaranteed, PBGC may be able to pay a
portion of the nonguaranteed amounts either from plan assets
(asset-funded benefits) or from recoveries from employers
(section 1322(c) benefits).86

77. See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
78. 29 C.F.R. §§ 4022.22-.23.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 4022.23(c).
81. Maximum
Monthly
Guarantee
Tables,
PBGC
(2015),
https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximumguarantee.html#2015. The maximum monthly benefit is lower if a benefit will be
paid to the retiree’s surviving spouse or other beneficiary upon the retiree’s death.
Id.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1), (7).
83. Id.
84. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 4022.24-.25.
85. See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a).
86. See id.
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Asset-funded benefits are nonguaranteed benefits that are
payable from a terminated plan’s assets.87 The amount of a
participant’s asset-funded benefits depends on how well-funded
the plan was at the termination date. Title IV provides a six-tier
hierarchy for allocating assets among various categories of
guaranteed and nonguaranteed benefits.88 The better funded
the plan is as of the plan termination date and the higher the
priority of the participant’s nonguaranteed benefit amounts, the
greater the chance some or all of these amounts will be paid.89
Lastly, PBGC pays section 1322(c) benefits.90
This
provision enables a plan’s participants to share a portion of
PBGC’s statutory claim for a plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities,
a topic discussed below.91 These benefits are intended to cover a
portion of participants’ unfunded nonguaranteed benefits.92
B. PBGC AND PLAN TERMINATION
When a pension plan covered under Title IV terminates
without enough assets to pay its promised benefits, PBGC
typically becomes the trustee of the plan and pays plan
participants their pension benefits up to statutory limits
described above.93 Title IV provides the exclusive means for a
plan sponsor to terminate a single-employer pension plan.94
This section will describe the methods by which a Title IV plan
may terminate.
1.

Voluntary Termination of Fully Funded Pension Plans

A plan sponsor of a single-employer plan may generally
elect to terminate a pension plan that has enough assets to pay
87. 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a). PBGC’s regulations describe the sum of guaranteed
benefits and asset-funded benefits as “Title IV benefits.” 29 C.F.R. § 4001.2.
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
89. Whether a participant will receive asset-funded benefits (and the amount of
such benefits) depends on whether the plan assets reach the participant’s
nonguaranteed benefits in the asset-allocation hierarchy. For example, benefits of
participants who retired (or could have retired) more than three years before
termination are entitled to priority; if the plan has enough assets, these benefits may
be paid even if not guaranteed. Id. § 1344(a)(3).
90. Id. § 1322(c).
91. Id. § 1362(b).
92. Id. § 1362(b)(1)(A).
93. See id. §§ 1321, 1322, 1361.
94. Id. § 1341(a)(1); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 446 (1999).
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all promised benefits.95 Commonly referred to as a standard
termination, the process for terminating a fully funded plan is
prescribed in detail by ERISA and PBGC’s regulations.96 There
are several fundamental obligations that must be met to
complete a standard termination. First, the plan administrator
must notify all participants, affected parties, and PBGC of its
intent to terminate the plan.97 Second, the administrator must
distribute plan assets to the plan participants98 either in the
form of an annuity or a lump-sum payment.99 Finally, the
administrator must certify to PBGC that all benefit liabilities
have been paid.100
If a plan administrator cannot locate a plan participant
after a diligent search, it may either purchase an annuity in the
participant’s name (and provide that information to PBGC) or
transfer to PBGC the value of that participant’s benefit.101
PBGC maintains a missing participant program and will pay
participants who contact the agency seeking to collect their
benefits or provide the name of the insurer from which their
annuity was purchased.102
PBGC is required to audit a statistically significant number
of standard terminations each year to ensure statutory
compliance.103 PBGC will also investigate a specific standard
termination if it receives notice from a participant of an
irregularity or otherwise has reason to believe that the plan may
have been terminated improperly.104
2. Voluntary Termination of Underfunded Pension Plans
If a plan sponsor wants to terminate a single-employer
pension plan that does not have enough assets to pay benefits
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b).
96. Id.; 29 C.F.R. §§ 4041.21-.31 (2014).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(1)(A).
98. Id. § 1341(b)(2)(D).
99. Id. § 1341(b)(3)(A). Unless the benefit is de minimis (under $5,000), or the
participant elects a lump sum, the benefit must be paid as an annuity under an
“irrevocable commitment” from an insurer. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(11)(A)
(2012).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(B).
101. Missing
Participants,
PBGC
(Feb.
2,
2015),
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/terminations/missing-participants.html.
102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1303(a).
104. Standard
Terminations,
PBGC
(Feb.
2,
2015),
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/terminations/standard-terminations.html.

16.2 GOLDOWITZ_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

THE PBGC WINS A CASE

10/1/15 10:29 AM

273

when due, it must satisfy the requirements for a distress
termination.105 As the term suggests, a distress termination is
permissible only in cases of severe financial hardship to the plan
sponsor and each member of its “controlled group.”106 Although
the exact meaning of “controlled group” is beyond the scope of
this paper, a controlled group generally includes entities
affiliated with the sponsor within prescribed degrees of
ownership, such as an 80%-owned subsidiary.107 As in the case
of a standard termination, the plan administrator is initially
obligated to notify all affected parties, as well as PBGC, of its
intent to terminate the plan.108 In addition, the administrator
must provide information to PBGC sufficient to establish that
the sponsor, and each of its controlled group members, meet at
least one of four tests:109 (1) the “Liquidation Test,”110 (2) the
“Reorganization Test,”111 (3) the “Business Continuation Test,”112
or (4) the “Pension Costs Test.”113
A plan sponsor meets the Liquidation Test if it has filed (or
has had filed against it) a petition to liquidate its assets under
the Bankruptcy Code or any similar federal or state insolvency
proceeding, and the case has not, as of the plan termination
date, been dismissed.114 The Reorganization Test requires a
more searching analysis. To satisfy this test, the plan sponsor
must file (or have filed against it) a petition seeking
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code or any similar
federal or state insolvency proceeding.115 The sponsor must then
establish to the satisfaction of the bankruptcy court (or other
appropriate court) that it “will be unable to pay all its debts
pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be unable to
continue in business outside . . . the reorganization process”
unless the pension plan is terminated.116 A more detailed
analysis of these two tests follows in Part IV.
In those instances where a distress termination is sought
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 1301(a)(14); 29 C.F.R. § 4001.2 (2014).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(1)(A).
109. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)-(C).
110. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i).
111. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii).
112. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii).
113. Id.
114. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i).
115. Id. § 1342(c)(2)(B)(ii).
116. Id.
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outside bankruptcy or a similar insolvency proceeding, PBGC
makes the initial determination whether the applicable test is
met.117
Under the Business Continuation Test, PBGC
determines whether a plan sponsor “will be unable to pay [its]
debts when due and will be unable to continue in business”
unless the pension plan is terminated.118 Under the Pension
Costs Test, PBGC must determine that “the cost of providing
pension coverage have become unreasonably burdensome . . . ,
solely as a result of a decline of the [plan sponsor’s]
workforce.”119
A plan sponsor and each member of its controlled group
must meet at least one of the distress tests described above,120
but each need not meet the same test.121 If one member of the
controlled group does not meet the criteria for distress
termination, PBGC will oppose termination.122 PBGC will also
oppose a distress termination if the plan sponsor or a controlled
group member is able to “top up” the plan and complete a
standard termination.123
3. Involuntary or PBGC-Initiated Termination of
Underfunded Pension Plans
A third way a pension plan can terminate is by an
involuntary or PBGC-initiated termination.124 PBGC-initiated
plan terminations can be mandatory or discretionary.125 ERISA
requires that PBGC terminate a single-employer pension plan
“as soon as practicable,” if the plan “does not have assets
available to pay benefits which are currently due under the
terms of the plan.”126 Put simply, if the plan runs out of money
to pay current retirees, PBGC must terminate the plan.
The four grounds for a discretionary PBGC-initiated
termination are as follows:
•

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

“the plan has not met the minimum funding

Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(II).
Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B).
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 1, at 9-41.
Id. at 9-42.
BEYER, supra note 8, at 38.
29 U.S.C. § 1342.
Id. § 1342(a).
Id.
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standard required under section 412 of [the
IRC] . . .;”127
“the plan will be unable to pay benefits when
due;”128
“the reportable event described in section
1343(c)(7) has occurred;”129 or
“the possible long-run loss to the corporation
with respect to the plan may reasonably be
expected to increase unreasonably if the plan is
not terminated.”130

The three most common of these grounds are discussed in
more detail in Part IV.
C. LIABILITY TO PBGC UPON PLAN TERMINATION
When an underfunded plan terminates,131 the Corporation
will seek to collect certain liabilities from the sponsor and
members of its controlled group.
1.

Unfunded Benefit Liabilities (UBL)

When a single-employer pension plan terminates, the plan
sponsor is generally liable to PBGC for “the total amount of the
unfunded benefit liabilities (as of the termination date) to all
participants and beneficiaries under the plan,” plus interest
from the termination date.132 The amount of UBL as of a certain
date is “the excess (if any) of . . . the value of the benefit
liabilities under the plan (determined as of such date on the
basis of assumptions prescribed by the corporation . . . , over the
current value (as of such date) of the assets of the plan.”133
PBGC has issued regulations prescribing the mortality and
interest assumptions to be used when calculating the amount of
benefit liabilities.134 For clarity, PBGC often refers to UBL as

127. Id. § 1342(a)(1).
128. Id. § 1342(a)(2).
129. Id. § 1342(a)(3). This is a rarely invoked ground for termination involving
certain distributions from a plan to a participant who is a “substantial owner.”
Id. §§ 1321(d), 1343(c)(7).
130. Id. § 1342(a)(4).
131. See id. §§ 1341(c), 1342.
132. Id. § 1362(a), (b).
133. Id. § 1301(a)(18).
134. 29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.52-.53 (2014); 29 C.F.R. pt. 4044 App. B (2014).
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the underfunding “on a termination basis.”135 This is a joint and
several liability of the sponsor and each member of the sponsor’s
controlled group.136
2. Unpaid Minimum Funding Contributions
The plan sponsor and members of its controlled group are
also jointly and severally liable to the pension plan for
contributions necessary to satisfy the minimum funding
standards.137 When the pension plan is terminated, this liability
is owed to PBGC as statutory trustee of the plan.138
3. Unpaid Annual Premiums
A plan sponsor and its controlled group members are jointly
and severally liable to PBGC for any unpaid insurance
premiums, interest, and penalties.139 This liability includes both
the flat-rate and variable-rate premiums.140
4. Termination Premium
Under certain circumstances discussed in Part IV, the plan
sponsor and members of its controlled group are jointly and
severally liable for a termination premium.141 The premium is
due to PBGC in three annual installments beginning with the
first month after the pension plan terminates.142 The amount of
each premium payment is equal to $1,250 multiplied by the
number of participants in the plan immediately before the
termination date.143
III.

BANKRUPTCY BASICS

A. INTRODUCTION
Before delving into PBGC’s involvement in bankruptcy, we
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Liability pursuant to section 4062(3), 29 C.F.R. § 4062.8(b) (2013).
29 U.S.C. § 1362(a).
26 U.S.C. § 412(b)(2) (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. § 1307(e).
Id. § 1307.
Id. § 1306(a)(7).
Id. § 1306(a)(7)(C).
Id. § 1306(a)(7)(A).
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will first explore some basic concepts of bankruptcy law. Article
1, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution provides Congress with
the authority to “establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States.”144
With that
authority, Congress has enacted five major bankruptcy statutes:
the Bankruptcy Acts of 1800, 1841, 1867, 1898,145 and the
present law, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the
Bankruptcy Code or Code).
One major innovation of the Bankruptcy Code was Chapter
11, which facilitated consensual reorganization to preserve the
going-concern value of business debtors.146 The Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 was mainly a creditor’s remedy focused on liquidation
and distribution of the debtor’s estate, rather than rehabilitation
or reorganization.147
The main goals of bankruptcy law are to: (1) provide a fresh
start for debtors and (2) promote equality of distribution among
creditors.148
B. FORMS OF BANKRUPTCY RELIEF
The Bankruptcy Code provides two forms of relief for
businesses: (1) liquidation under Chapter 7 and (2)
reorganization under Chapter 11.
In a liquidation under Chapter 7, a debtor generally gives
up possession and control of all property owned at the time of
the bankruptcy filing to the debtor’s estate.149 The debtor’s
estate is then administered by a trustee who is a disinterested
person appointed by a United States trustee from a panel of
private trustees.150 The Chapter 7 trustee collects the debtor’s
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
145. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440;
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544.
146. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 161, 181 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). See Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle
St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999) (“[I]t was, after all, one of the Code’s innovations
to narrow the occasions for courts to make valuation judgments, as shown by its
preference for the supramajoritarian class creditor voting scheme in § 1126(c)”).
147. 1 WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 20.01 (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013).
148. JEFFERY T. FERRIEL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 1
(3rd ed. 2013) [hereinafter FERRIEL & JANGER].
149. Id. at 401. Courts exempt some of the debtor’s possessions; nevertheless,
the Chapter 7 process generally requires liquidation of the debtor’s assets to repay
creditors.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). A United States Trustee is a Department of Justice

GOLDOWITZ(DO NOT DELETE)

278

10/1/15 10:29 AM

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16.2

property, converts that property to cash, submits a final report
and accounting to the bankruptcy court, and makes distributions
to creditors.151 At the end of this liquidation process, a Chapter
7 debtor who is an individual may generally obtain a discharge
from personal liability for certain prebankruptcy debts, and thus
is given a “fresh start.”152 A business debtor, however, will not
obtain a discharge under Chapter 7 because no business
operations will remain post-bankruptcy.153
Chapter 11 governs the reorganization of business entities.
Chapter 11 creditors for the most part look to the debtor’s future
earnings to satisfy their claims rather than to the debtor’s
property at the time of bankruptcy filing.154 Businesses use
Chapter 11 to restructure prepetition debt or rationalize their
operations.155 Unlike Chapter 7, the debtor’s management in
Chapter 11 usually continues to control the debtor’s property
and business operations. Such a debtor is known as a “debtor in
possession.”156 The bankruptcy court may appoint a Chapter 11
trustee, but typically only after a showing of fraud or gross
mismanagement by the debtor’s current management.157 For
simplicity, this paper will generally use the term “debtor” to
include an appointed bankruptcy trustee.
Chapter 11 requires the debtor to formulate an acceptable
plan for payment or compromise of its prepetition debts.158 The
plan must meet certain standards to be confirmed by the
court.159 Depending on the facts and circumstances, however,
the court may confirm a liquidating plan of reorganization,
rather than a plan where the debtor emerges from bankruptcy
as an operating entity. Upon plan confirmation, the debtor
generally receives a discharge of all debts that arose before
confirmation (unless the debtor liquidates through Chapter

official appointed for a judicial district who performs certain administrative and
enforcement roles in connection with bankruptcy cases.
See id. § 307; 28
U.S.C. §§ 581-89b (2012).
151. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 704.
152. See generally id. § 727; FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 455.
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.
154. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 711.
155. Troy A. McKenzie & Keith Sharfman, Basic Program: Basic Concepts:
Sources of Law, Structure of Code, Bankruptcy Courts, Legal Ethics and Estate
Property, 092111 ABI-CLE 5, at 17 (2011) [hereinafter McKenzie & Sharfman].
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).
157. Id. § 1104.
158. Id. § 1106(a)(5).
159. Id. § 1129.
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11).160
C. KEY BANKRUPTCY CONCEPTS
Certain concepts are essential to understanding bankruptcy
law. Among the most important for our purposes are (1)
property of the estate, (2) avoidance powers, (3) the automatic
stay, (4) claims, and (5) executory contracts.
1. Property of the Estate
A bankruptcy case is commenced by the filing of a petition
with the bankruptcy court.161 The filing may be either voluntary
by the debtor or involuntary against the debtor by its
creditors.162 Upon commencement of bankruptcy, a debtor’s
property generally becomes “property of the estate,” which is
available to satisfy creditors’ claims.163 Property of the estate is
subject to court supervision.164 Property of the estate includes
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”165 This broad definition includes
not only tangible property interests, but contractually
enforceable rights of the debtor at the time of bankruptcy
filing.166
The Code provides two main exceptions: (1) excluded
property and (2) exempted property.167 Among the specific
exclusions from property of the estate are educational savings
accounts, tuition benefit funds, spendthrift trusts, and
contributions to certain employee benefit funds and pension
plans.168 Although exempted assets initially become property of
the estate, the debtor may “exempt them back out of the
160. Id. § 1141.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3), plan confirmation does not
discharge the debtor if (1) the plan is a liquidating plan, (2) the debtor does not
engage in business after consummation of the plan; and (3) the debtor would be
denied a discharge in a liquidation case under section 727(a) of the Code.
161. Id. §§ 301, 303.
162. Id.
163. See id. § 541.
164. DANIEL L. KEATING, BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BANKRUPTCY'S
IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, AND RETIREES 27 (1995) [hereinafter
KEATING].
165. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
166. KEATING, supra note 164, at 27.
167. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522 (exemptions), 541(a)(1), (b), (c)(2) (exclusions); McKenzie &
Sharfman, supra note 155, at 20.
168. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b).
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estate.”169 Such exemptions give the debtor power to protect
certain items of property from the reach of creditors.170 One
complication is that while the Code lists a standard set of federal
exemptions, states are permitted to opt out of the federal
exemptions and to use state-enacted exemptions.171 Because
most states have exercised this power, there is a wide disparity
among the assets that may be exempted in the various states.172
2. Avoidance Powers
One concept closely related to the property of the estate is
the debtor’s avoidance powers. The power to “avoid” or unwind
certain transactions enables a debtor to maximize the property
of the estate for the benefit of creditors generally.173
a. Strong-Arm Power
The so-called “strong-arm” provision is designed to
discourage secret liens.174
The debtor has the power to
invalidate any secured creditor’s lien on the debtor’s property if
it is unperfected as of the bankruptcy filing date.175
By
exercising the strong-arm power, the debtor may transform an
unperfected secured claim into a general unsecured claim for
purposes of bankruptcy distribution.176
b. Preferences
Another power available to the debtor is to avoid
“preferences.”177 The Code permits a debtor to recover certain
transfers by the debtor to a creditor where payment on account
of an antecedent debt occurred while the debtor was insolvent
and within ninety days before the filing of the petition.178 One
condition is that the transfer enabled the creditor to receive

169. McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 20.
170. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 402.
171. Id. at 404.
172. Id.
173. 11 U.S.C. § 926.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 544. See also KEATING, supra note 164, at 34.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 34-35. See infra Section III.C.4. for a discussion of claims.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
178. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
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more than it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.179
In the case of transfers to an “insider,” the preference period
may extend from 90 days to one year before the filing of the
petition.180 This power prevents a debtor from rewarding one
creditor at the expense of others, or one creditor from gaining
unfair advantage over other creditors. In effect, it bars creditors
from exempting themselves from the bankruptcy process by
receiving payment or collateral from the debtor on the eve of the
filing.181
c.

Fraudulent Transfers

The debtor also has the power to avoid certain transfers
considered fraudulent. In particular, the debtor may avoid
“actually fraudulent” transfers—those made or incurred within
two years of filing “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud” present or future creditors.182 In addition, a debtor
may avoid “constructively fraudulent” transfers, including those
it made while insolvent for less than equivalent value within two
years before filing.183
3. Automatic Stay
To conduct an orderly bankruptcy proceeding, it is
important to stop all efforts to collect from the debtor.184
Otherwise, creditors would inevitably race to collect the debtor’s
assets, which would quickly be dissipated.185 The automatic stay
provides a debtor with protection from creditors’ collection
efforts, including most forms of litigation.186 Upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay immediately enjoins
nearly all other proceedings and acts that affect the debtor or
property of the debtor’s estate.187
The automatic stay has certain enumerated exceptions, and,
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. § 547(b)(5)(A).
Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). Id. § 101(31) (defining the term “insider”).
KEATING, supra note 164, at 34-35.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 548(a)(1)(B).
BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 103-04 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
ALDER, BAIRD & JACKSON].
185. Id.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
187. Id.
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in some instances, the court may grant a party in interest relief
from the stay. A court may grant relief by conditioning,
annulling, modifying, or completely terminating the automatic
stay.188
In particular, creditors may seek relief from the
automatic stay if they show “cause,” which can include a lack of
adequate protection of an interest in property.189 The Code
enumerates a variety of automatic stay exceptions, but the socalled “police-powers” exception is especially relevant to PBGC
and other government agencies.190 This exception—together
with an express provision of ERISA that applies to “any
bankruptcy”—exempts from the automatic stay an action by
PBGC to initiate termination of a pension plan.191
4. Claims
Once the bankruptcy case commences and the automatic
stay takes effect, the bankruptcy process dictates the resolution
of all debts and determines the distribution each creditor will
receive.192 Only creditors that have “claims” are eligible to
receive distributions.193 Indeed, many issues in bankruptcy
hinge upon which parties have a “claim.”194
The Code defines “claim” as “any right to payment, whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured,” or a right to
payment stemming from a “right to equitable remedy.”195 This
broad definition, for example, encompasses PBGC’s contingent
claims for termination liability when a plan sponsor or controlled
group member files for bankruptcy, even if the plan has not
terminated.
Although the existence of a claim determines whether a
creditor is eligible to receive a distribution, the type and
seniority of the claim determines the amount and sequence of
the creditor’s distribution. The general distribution scheme in
bankruptcy is as follows: (1) secured creditors first take the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. § 362(d).
Id. § 362(d)(1). McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 20.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
29 U.S.C. § 1342(e) (2012).
ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 141.
FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 312.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
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value of their security, (2) then administrative expenses and
priority claims are paid, and (3) lastly general unsecured
creditors receive any residue on a pro rata basis.196 Holders of
equity interests generally have no “claim” and in practice rarely
receive a distribution.197
a. Secured Claims
Whether a claim is secured is determined by nonbankruptcy
law. Typically state law, such as Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code for security interests in personal property,
determines such claim security.198 A creditor is secured only to
the extent of the value of the collateral securing the claim.199
Accordingly, if the value of the collateral is less than the amount
of the claim, the amount of the deficiency is an undersecured
claim.200 An undersecured claim is thus effectively two claims:
one secured and one unsecured.201 If the collateral has value
above the principal amount of the claim and expenses,
postpetition interest is allowed.202 The court has discretion to
determine the value in light of the valuation’s purpose and the
proposed disposition or use of the property.203 For example,
either liquidation value or going-concern value may be
appropriate, depending on the type of collateral and other facts
and circumstances.204
b. Priority Claims
The Code enumerates ten categories of unsecured expenses
and claims that are entitled to priority in distribution.205 Among
these types of expenses and claims are the following: first,
priority for domestic support obligations; second, priority for
“administrative expenses,” an especially important category
discussed below; third priority for so-called “gap” claims in
involuntary bankruptcy cases; fourth, priority for employee wage
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 11.
11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), (7).
McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 18.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
Id.
See FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 338.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b). See FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 341.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). See FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 338-41.
See McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 18.
11 U.S.C. § 507(a).
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claims; fifth, priority for claims for certain contributions to
employee benefit plans; and sixth, priority for certain claims of
governmental units, also discussed below.206
The second priority, or administrative expenses, includes
“actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,”
such as wages and salaries of employees, and certain taxes
incurred by the estate.207 “Administrative expenses” also include
reasonable compensation for professional services rendered
during the bankruptcy case.208 Administrative expenses are not
technically “claims” because they did not arise prepetition.209
Because administrative expenses in business bankruptcies are
paid immediately after secured claims, creditors generally have
an incentive to keep administrative expenses as low as
possible.210 If the debtor has so few assets that administrative
expenses cannot be paid in full, the estate is said to be
“administratively insolvent.”211 Unless a potential investor
arrives on the scene, an administratively insolvent debtor will
generally shut down, and then liquidate. In such a case,
administrative expenses will be paid pro-rata and lower-ranked
creditors will receive nothing.212 Likewise, if assets available for
distribution run out in one of the lower priorities, then the
creditors with higher priority claims will be paid in full.
Creditors in the priority where the assets run out receive pro
rata distributions, and creditors in lower priorities receive
nothing.213
To round out this discussion of priorities, the eighth priority
governs certain claims of “governmental units,” mainly taxes.214
In contrast to postpetition taxes, which are treated as
administrative expenses, prepetition taxes are given eighth

206. Id. § 507(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8). See McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note
155, at 18.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), (B).
208. Id. § 503(b)(4).
209. See McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 18.
210. ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 11.
211. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2), (b).
212. See Robert J. Keach, et al., Concurrent Session: Business Track My Estate Is
Administratively Insolvent: What Do I Do? What to Do When Your Case Turns Out
Differently from How You Planned, 120111 ABI-CLE 223 at 2 (2011) (describing the
designation as “administratively insolvent” as a condition in Chapter 11
proceedings).
213. ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 11.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8); id. § 101(27) (defining “governmental unit”).
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priority.215
c.

General Unsecured Claims

General unsecured claims are claims that are not secured
and do not have a priority.216
Creditors holding general
unsecured claims receive a pro rata share of any assets
remaining after distributions to secured claims, administrative
expenses, and priority claims.217
5. Executory Contracts
The code does not define “executory contracts” even though
it is an important concept. According to one widely accepted
definition, a contract is executory if “the obligation of both the
bankrupt and other party to the contract are so far unperformed
that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other.”218 For convenience, the term “executory contract” is used
in this paper to include unexpired leases, which for the most
part are handled like executory contracts.219 The Code gives the
debtor three options for treatment of executory contracts: (1)
rejection, (2) assumption, or (3) assignment.220
If the debtor chooses to reject an executory contract, then
rejection will be treated as if the debtor had breached the
contract immediately before filing for bankruptcy.221 The party
to the rejected contract therefore will have a claim for damages,
which is usually unsecured.222 If the debtor assumes a contract,
then the debtor binds the other party to future performance and
also binds itself to cure any defaults under the contract.223 If a
debtor assigns the contract, any proceeds from the assignment of
the debtor’s rights under the contract become property of the
estate.224 The trustee and estate are relieved from any liability
215. Id. § 503(b)(2)(B)(i). Id. § 507(a)(8).
216. McKenzie & Sharfman, supra note 155, at 57.
217. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 355.
218. KEATING, supra note 164, at 37 (quoting Vern Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
220. Id. § 365 (a), (f).
221. KEATING, supra note 164, at 37.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 27.
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for any breach of the executory contract that occurs after the
assignment.225 The other party to the contract must look to the
assignee for satisfaction of post-assignment obligations.226
Although the debtor’s choice of how to treat an executory
contract is subject to judicial approval, courts usually defer to
the debtor’s decision.227
The Code provides special rules for a Chapter 11 debtor to
assume or reject collective bargaining agreements.228 Collective
bargaining agreements are strikingly different from ordinary
contracts in that they set out the relationship between
management and labor, which is regulated by the National
Labor Relations Board under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). 229 In an effort to accommodate labor policy,230 the Code
prescribes strict standards and procedures that condition a
debtor’s ability to modify or reject its collective-bargaining
agreements upon the expiration of a set time period during
which the debtor and union are “to confer in good faith in
attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications.”231 If
the parties fail to agree, the court may approve the debtor’s
proposal. But the court must first make certain findings,
including that the modifications are “necessary” and that “the
balance of equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.”232
Such proceedings are especially relevant to PBGC when debtors
seek to modify collective-bargaining agreements that require
them to maintain and fund a pension plan.
There are also special rules under the Code for a Chapter 11
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

11 U.S.C. § 365(k).
Id.
KEATING, supra note 164, at 38.
11 U.S.C. § 1113.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012); 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L.
NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:14 (3d ed. 2015)
[hereinafter NORTON]. The NLRA regulates private-sector collective bargaining
rights.
230. Section 8(d) of the NLRA prohibits an employer from rejecting or modifying
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement before its expiration date without first
bargaining with the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). More generally, under section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, it is illegal for an employer to “refuse to bargain” with the
union. See id. § 158(a)(5).
231. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b). See generally Daniel S Ehrenberg, Rejecting Collective
Bargaining Agreements under Section 1113 of Chapter 11 of the 1984 Bankruptcy
Code: Resolving the Tension Between Labor Law and Bankruptcy Law, 2 J.L. & POL’Y
55, 59 (1994); John D. Ayer et al., The Intersection of Chapter 11 and Labor Law, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., May 2007, at 22; Andrew B. Dawson, Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Corporate Reorganizations, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103 (2010).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A), (c).
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debtor to modify or not pay retiree insurance benefits.233 These
procedures are generally limited to employer-sponsored medical,
disability, or death benefits, and do not apply to pension
benefits.234 The rules for modifying retiree insurance benefits
have parallels to those for rejecting collective bargaining
agreements, except that instead of a union, a committee of
retired employees appointed by the court may serve as the
authorized representative of retirees.235
6. Discharge
At the core of the “fresh start” objective of bankruptcy
discussed above is the concept of discharge. Whether granted at
the end of an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 case or upon
confirmation of a non-liquidating Chapter 11 plan, a discharge
generally protects the debtor from any further liability on
discharged debts.236 A discharge voids a judgment on discharged
debts and enjoins any legal “action” to collect such a debt from
the debtor or property of the debtor.237 A discharge also bars
extrajudicial collection “acts” such as dunning letters or
telephone calls to press for payment of discharged debts.238
D. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11
Most of PBGC’s activity in bankruptcy is in Chapter 11
cases. A Chapter 11 case proceeds as follows. First, a troubled
company—but one with enough going-concern value to
reorganize successfully—files a Chapter 11 petition. The debtor
continues to run its business and at the same time seeks to
propose a plan of reorganization that divides the claims of
creditors into various classes and prescribes a treatment for each
class. The debtor tries to negotiate key terms with important
constituencies, including specific creditors and committees of
creditors, in hopes of devising a comprehensive plan to which
each claim class consents. Finally, if the debtor succeeds, all
claim classes will vote in favor of the plan and the court will
confirm it. The discussion below will briefly examine each of

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. § 1114.
Id. § 1114(a).
Id. § 1114(b), (c).
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727, 1141(d).
Id. § 524(a).
See 3 NORTON, supra note 229, § 58:3.
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these major phases.
1. Commencement of a Case
Like other bankruptcy proceedings, a Chapter 11 case
commences with the filing of a petition.239 The commencement
of a voluntary case constitutes an “order for relief” and triggers
the automatic stay.240 As noted earlier, creditors may initiate
bankruptcy through an involuntary petition.241
The Code
generally permits an involuntary petition to be filed by three or
more creditors who hold claims of a specified type and
amount.242 If the debtor contests the involuntary filing, the
creditors must show that the debtor was not generally paying its
debts as the debts became due at the time of the filing.243
The debtor must make a number of initial filings such as a
list of creditors, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of
current income and current expenditures, and a statement of
financial affairs.244 Debtors typically obtain “first-day” orders on
an ex parte basis.245 First-day orders may authorize the debtor
to keep paying certain prepetition debts, such as utility
payments and employee wages and benefits, and may also
include approval of postpetition financing.246 Once the case
commences, a number of other parties will play major roles—
some almost immediately, and others over time.
a. Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) Lender
The debtor’s ability to survive more than a few days in
Chapter 11 usually depends on its ability to line up postpetition
financing. Ideally, before the filing of a petition, the debtor has
negotiated preliminary financial terms with a lender to finance
the debtor’s postpetition operations for some specified period of
time. Subject to objection by creditors, the court will decide
whether or not to approve the DIP-financing package.247 Failure
to obtain any DIP financing nearly always leads to rapid
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

11 U.S.C. § 301(a).
Id. §§ 301(b), 362.
Id. § 303.
Id. § 303(b)(1).
Id. § 303(h).
Id. § 521(a). See also FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 176.
See 1 NORTON, supra note 229, § 3:14.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 364.
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liquidation.
b. Committees
Also shortly after the petition is filed, the United States
trustee appoints a committee of unsecured creditors.248
Typically an unsecured creditors’ committee consists of the seven
largest creditors.249
Committee members must be
“representative of the different kinds of claims.”250 The United
States trustee may also appoint other committees to represent
secured creditors and equity holders if appropriate.251 Because
it would be impractical for a debtor to negotiate separately with
hundreds or thousands of creditors, committees play a major role
in formulating a plan of reorganization and sometimes in
litigating major controversies.252
Unsecured creditors’
committee members have a fiduciary duty to the unsecured
creditor body.253
c.

Potential Sources of Exit Financing

To emerge from bankruptcy, the debtor must find a way to
finance its reorganization plan. The DIP lender is often a
leading candidate for exit financing, but the package will have to
be negotiated and approved by the court as part of a
reorganization plan. A competing lender, possibly one favored
by the unsecured creditors’ committee, may vie for this role. The
unsecured creditors themselves—perhaps by accepting a smaller
cash distribution on their claims in early postpetition years in
favor of a potentially greater cash recovery in later years, or by
agreeing to convert their debt holdings into equity in the
reorganized debtor—may be a major source of financing.
Employee groups may be asked to make wage concessions. Key
suppliers may be asked for future price discounts. An outside
investor may also play a pivotal role.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. § 1102(a)(1).
Id. § 1102(b)(1).
Id.
See id. § 1102(a)(1), 1 NORTON, supra note 229, § 3:14.
ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 679.
See 5 NORTON, supra note 229, § 98:36.
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2. The Plan of Reorganization
At the heart of the Chapter 11 reorganization process is the
plan of reorganization. To expand somewhat on our earlier
overview, the plan of reorganization process is as follows: (1) the
debtor (or any “party in interest” under certain conditions)254
proposes a plan of reorganization; (2) the claims of the creditors
and the interest of the shareholders are then placed in classes;
(3) each class votes on the plan; (4) if all classes accept the plan
and the plan satisfies other Chapter 11 requirements, then the
court confirms the plan, or if a class dissents, then the court
confirms the plan only if the plan is fair and equitable and does
not discriminate unfairly; and (5) once the plan is confirmed, the
debtor obtains a discharge from debts that arose before
confirmation.255
a. First Stage: Proposal of Plan of Reorganization
One of a debtor’s major advantages is the exclusive right to
file a plan for the first 120 days of the case.256 After expiration
of the debtor’s exclusivity period—which may be extended up to
18 months after the order for relief—any party in interest may
propose a plan. Multiple competing plans may proceed to a
confirmation hearing simultaneously.257
Debtors negotiate with the committees and other key
constituents throughout the plan process because a consensual
plan is often the quickest and cleanest way to confirmation.258
In many cases, senior creditors give up value to junior classes to
achieve a consensus, and recoveries may improve generally if
major claims and controversies are settled rather than litigated
to finality.259
b. Second Stage: Classification of Claims
Classification of claims is critical in formulating a plan as it

254. A “party in interest” is defined to include “the debtor, the trustee, a
creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity
security holder, or any indenture trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012).
255. ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 675.
256. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). KEATING, supra note 164, at 39.
257. 11 U.S.C § 1129(c).
258. ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 681.
259. Id.
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can affect who gets what under the plan, and also directly affects
confirmation if any degree of creditor dissent is expected.260 A
plan must classify claims and provide the “same treatment” for
all claims within a class, unless the claimant agrees to less
favorable treatment.261 The Code governs classification of claims
and provides that a plan may only place a claim in a particular
class if it is “substantially similar” to other claims of such
class.262
c.

Third Stage: Voting on Plan

After the debtor proposes a plan, the debtor must then try
to get the plan accepted.263 To do this, the debtor must first
submit a disclosure statement for court approval.264 A disclosure
statement explains the plan to those who must vote on it, and is
reviewed by the court to ensure that it contains “adequate
information.”265 “Adequate information is information “of a
kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable”
to enable a “hypothetical investor” to make “an informed
judgment about the plan.”266
Once the court approves the disclosure statement, the next
step is to solicit votes for plan acceptance. Creditors vote on
whether to approve a plan, with two key exceptions. First, any
holder of a claim or interest that is not “impaired” is deemed to
have accepted the plan and no solicitation of such holder is
required.267 Second, a class that is to receive nothing under the
plan is deemed to have rejected the plan and again no
solicitation of such class is required.268 For classes that vote, at
least two-thirds in amount of claims and more than one-half in
number of claimants must vote in favor of the plan for the plan
to be accepted by that class.269

260. KEATING, supra note 164, at 40-41.
261. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4).
262. Id. § 1122.
263. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 760.
264. 11 U.S.C. § 1125.
265. Id. § 1125(b); FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 760-61.
266. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
267. Id. §§ 1124, 1126(f).
268. Id. § 1126(g).
269. ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 184, at 698; see also 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8).
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d. Fourth Stage: Confirmation of Plan
In addition to the voting classes’ acceptance of the plan, the
court must confirm the plan after a hearing.270 To confirm a
plan, the court must find the following: that the plan complies
with applicable provisions of the Code; has been proposed in
good faith; discloses the identity and salaries of officers,
directors, and certain others; and has been either accepted by
voting class or satisfies the “cramdown” rule (to be discussed
below).271 Another requirement for confirmation is called the
“best-interests-of-creditors” test. It requires: that each holder of
a claim or interest in an impaired class either (i) has accepted
the plan, or (ii) receives as much under the plan as it would have
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.272 This test applies to each
individual creditor, including dissenting members of a class that
approved the plan.273 Still another standard to be met for plan
confirmation is “feasibility”: that the debtor can carry out the
terms of the plan and will likely not liquidate or need further
financial reorganization after confirmation unless the plan
proposes such liquidation or reorganization.274
For the plan to be confirmed, each impaired class must
accept the plan by the requisite majority vote.275
For a
nonconsensual plan, however, the Code provides an exception
called the cramdown rule.276 A nonconsensual plan may be
confirmed if, among other things, the plan is “fair and equitable”
and does not “discriminate unfairly.”277 The central concept
behind this exception is the so-called “absolute priority” rule:
that senior classes must be paid in full before any junior classes
may receive any distribution.278 If a dissenting class is not paid
in full, no class junior to the dissenting class may receive a
distribution.279 Accordingly, a class of unsecured claims that is
not paid in full may be crammed down as long as stockholders

270. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).
271. Id. § 1129(a)(1), (3), (5), (8); see also id. § 1129(b) (“cramdown” provision).
272. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
273. Id.
274. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
275. Id. §§ 1126(d), 1129(a)(8).
276. Id. § 1129(b); KEATING, supra note 164, at 41.
277. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
278. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 780-81; ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON,
supra note 184, at 681.
279. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 789.
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receive no distribution.280 Further, although the cramdown
approach does not require acceptance by all classes, acceptance
by at least one impaired class is still required.281 Although
cramdown is an option for a nonconsensual plan, the risk of a
contested confirmation hearing usually makes a consensual plan
the preferred course.282
e. Final Stage: Discharge Postconfirmation
Once a plan is confirmed, the debtor carries out the plan
according to its terms and discharges all debts that arose before
confirmation except where the plan provides otherwise.283 The
plan and its confirmation order are binding on the debtor and
any creditor, equity security holder, or general partner in the
debtor “whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or
general partner has accepted the plan.”284
Accordingly, a
confirmed plan has res judicata effect in any claim dispute.285
3. Asset Sales
Chapter 11 is mainly designed for business reorganization,
but debtors are increasingly using it to facilitate the sale of all or
substantially all their assets.286 Commonly, debtors seek to sell
their assets through a process known as a “Section 363 sale,”
where a debtor may obtain court approval to sell property of the
estate “other than in the ordinary course of business.”287 This is
to be distinguished from the use, sale, or lease of property of the
estate “in the ordinary course of business,” which may generally
take place without notice or a hearing.288 Asset sales under
Chapter 11 allow debtors to maintain control of the business
operations and to sell their assets as a going concern, which
generally results in a higher sale price.289 Another attractive

280. Id.
281. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1); see also KEATING, supra note 164, at 41-42.
282. Id. at 17.
283. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).
284. Id. § 1141(a).
285. FERRIEL & JANGER, supra note 148, at 800-01.
286. Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of a § 363 Sale,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2011, at 48 [hereinafter Deutsch & Distefano].
287. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
288. Id. § 363(c).
289. See Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 286, at 48; Felton E. Parrish, Jo Ann J.
Brighton & James E. Morgan, Sales of Assets Under Section 363, in COLLIER GUIDE
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reason to sell assets under Chapter 11 is that the Code permits
buyers to purchase assets “free and clear of any interest in such
property” as long as certain conditions are met.290
The Code allows a debtor to complete a section 363 sale
after notice and a hearing.291 Such sales generally occur through
a public auction process.292 First, the debtor will attempt to find
a “stalking-horse bidder” (one who sets the floor value through
an opening bid).293 Once the debtor either (1) agrees to a
purchase agreement with the stalking-horse bidder, or (2) in the
absence of a stalking-horse bidder, is ready to market the assets
for sale, the debtor asks the court to approve a set of bidding
procedures. 294
A court’s decision on bidding procedures is based on the
following: whether the procedures will maximize the sale price,
are necessary and made in good faith, and are beneficial to
creditors.295 The debtor may seek protections for a stalkinghorse bidder such as breakup fees (payments to a potential
purchaser in the event the transaction does not close), bidder
qualifications (minimum requirements for potential purchasers
to submit alternate bids), or overbid requirements (a minimum
amount by which a subsequent bid must exceed the prior bid).296
If another bidder ends up winning the competition, then such
protections compensate the stalking-horse bidder for the costs of
assuming that role. Bidding procedures also include a period for
the debtor to approach other prospective buyers, a period for any
interested parties in purchasing the assets to conduct due
diligence, and a deadline for submitting additional bids.297
If interested parties (other than the stalking-horse bidder)
timely submit bids, the debtor usually holds an auction where
each of the bidders can increase their respective bids. At the end
of the auction, the debtor selects the winning bidder and seeks
court approval of the sale.298 Often, the possibility of objections
to the sale and the complexity of the terms of some bids require
CHAPTER 11: KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES § 3.02 (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds.).
290. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
291. Id. § 363(b)(1).
292. Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 286, at 48.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
TO
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a searching analysis by the court.
IV.

PBGC’S ROLE IN BANKRUPTCY

A. INTRODUCTION
One approach to examining PBGC’s experience in
bankruptcy would be to begin by discussing statistics on the
number of active bankruptcies in which the agency participated
in select years of its history. For example, in 2014, PBGC was
involved in 319 active bankruptcy and state-receivership cases,
the great majority of which were bankruptcy proceedings.299 But
a more practical introduction might be to illustrate favorable
and unfavorable outcomes for PBGC in bankruptcy with
anecdotes from two actual cases under Chapter 11. These
examples are at the extremes. Most cases involve more routine
rescues, or more routine abandonments, of a debtor’s pension
plan.
1. A Favorable Outcome: American Airlines
When companies enter bankruptcy, PBGC first seeks to
preserve their plans if possible—as in the case of American
Airlines. American and its parent, AMR Corporation, “entered
bankruptcy in November 2011 and immediately announced
plans to terminate American’s four pension plans for its 130,000
workers and retirees.”300 In response, PBGC worked with the
airline, its unions, and other creditors to show the airline that it
could afford to maintain its pension plans.301 American’s plans
were underfunded by $12 billion.302 In 2012, the airline agreed
with PBGC and moved to freeze, rather than terminate, its
pension plans.303
Throughout 2012 and 2013, PBGC
collaborated with unions, the company, and others to help
resolve many issues. One such issue was elimination of a lump299. See 2014 PBGC ANN. REP., supra note 14, at 95. “Case” is defined here to
count only the bankruptcy of the pension plan’s sponsor, not every affiliated company
that may file a separate petition.
300. See
2013
PBGC
ANN.
REP.
ii,
12,
available
at
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2013-annual-report.pdf.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Jerry Geisel, American Airlines Freezes its Pension Plans, WORKFORCE.COM
(Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.workforce.com/articles/american-airlines-freezes-itspension-plans.
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sum option in the plan covering American’s pilots, which is an
unusual event discussed later in this paper.304 AMR’s proposed
plan of reorganization involved a merger with US Airways. In
August 2013, the Department of Justice brought a civil action
under federal antitrust law to enjoin the planned merger.305 The
suit was settled in a way that allowed the merger and permitted
AMR to emerge from bankruptcy in December 2013, with the
pension plans frozen but not terminated.306
2. An Unfavorable Outcome: Friendly Ice Cream
In October 2011, Friendly Ice Cream Corporation and its
subsidiaries, a retail restaurant chain, filed for bankruptcy.307
Sun Capital private equity funds had acquired Friendly in a
leveraged buyout.308 Sun Capital created the capital structure,
appointed the company’s managers, and provided financing
before bankruptcy and through DIP financing during the
bankruptcy.309 Shortly after filing for bankruptcy,310 the debtors
filed a motion to sell substantially all their assets to another Sun
Capital affiliate. The latter declined to assume the pension
plan.311 The proposed buyer submitted a “credit bid” at the sale,
which is a practice whereby a secured creditor bids for property
of the estate using the debt it is owed to offset the purchase

304. Edward Thomas Veal, IRS Allows Elimination of Lump Sum Distributions
as an Alternative to Termination of Bankrupt Employer’s Underfunded Pension Plan,
ASSOCIATION
OF
CORPORATE
COUNSEL:
LEXOLOGY
(Nov.
29,
2012),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8612bf14-5ed2-46a0-a310e98da6917c5f.
305. Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Requires US Airways and
American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance System-wide
Competition and Settle Merger Challenge (Nov. 12, 2013), JUSTICE.GOV, available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-us-airways-and-americanairlines-divest-facilities-seven-key.
306. Jack Nicas & Brent Kendall, Big Airline Merger Is Cleared to Fly: AMR, US
Airways Agree to Limited Concession in Settlement with U.S., WALL STREET J. (Nov.
13,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304644104579193804169829002; see
2014 PBGC ANN. REP. 6, supra note 14.
307. Hon. Joshua Gotbaum, ABI Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11:
Statement
of
Hon.
Joshua
Gotbaum,
4
(Mar.
14,
2013),
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Gotbaum-ABI-Statement.pdf. [hereinafter Gotbaum
Statement].
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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price.312 In December 2011, less than three months after
Friendly entered bankruptcy and before the debtors proposed
any reorganization plan, the court approved the sale.313 Faced
with what would soon be an abandoned pension plan left behind
with a liquidating corporate shell, PBGC reluctantly took steps
to terminate it.314 Active and retired participants suffered a loss
of half a million dollars in nonguaranteed benefits.315 PBGC
assumed unfunded benefit liabilities of $115 million. To pave
the way for court approval, Sun Capital paid a modest amount to
settle litigation brought by PBGC and the unsecured creditors’
committee in opposition to the sale.316
B. CREDITORS’ COMMITTEES AND PBGC PARTICIPATION
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to
expressly allow a pension guarantor (i.e., PBGC) to be a member
of a creditors’ committee.317 Before the amendment, some
United States trustees took the position that appointment of
PBGC to a creditors’ committee was impermissible, or at least
inappropriate. Because PBGC often holds the largest unsecured
claims in a bankruptcy, the agency typically cites its strong
interest in the fiscal integrity and successful reorganization of
the debtor as a rationale for appointment. The agency also
typically highlights its specialized knowledge in employee
benefits, labor, administrative law, and taxation as useful
expertise to contribute to the committee and bankruptcy process.
Although PBGC membership on creditors’ committees is now
commonplace and advantageous to the agency, it does not
become a committee member in every case. Because PBGC’s
resources are limited, it must be selective in choosing cases in
which to seek committee membership.
C. PLAN TERMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY
The reason for PBGC’s involvement in bankruptcy is nearly
312. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065,
2069 (2012).
313. Mike Spector, Two Hats a Fit for Friendly’s Owner, WALL ST. J. (July 27,
2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443477104577551000555121714.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41)(B), 1102(b) (2012).
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always the debtor’s sponsorship of an underfunded pension plan.
Especially for small debtors, the pension plan is often far down
the list of concerns early in the case. PBGC will typically send a
“shot-across-the-bow” letter to debtor’s counsel with the aim of
reminding the sponsor and plan administrator of their
responsibilities for funding and maintaining the plan, including
the strict criteria for terminating an underfunded plan. After
some months, most debtors will have begun to focus on the
future of the plan. In many cases, there is little question that
the plan is affordable, and it will “ride through” the bankruptcy.
The debtor may also favor continuing the plan as a tool to retain
valued employees who may be tempted to look for new jobs
rather than risk staying with a company in bankruptcy.
Alternatively, maintaining the plan may be required by a
collective bargaining agreement. Even if the debtor takes steps
in bankruptcy to reject its agreement,318 it may be unsuccessful,
or the pension plan may be preserved as part of a settlement.
On the other hand, the debtor, certain creditors, or potential
investors may see bankruptcy as an opportunity to rid the
company of “legacy costs,” which may include pensions.
Throughout a reorganization, PBGC considers whether the
interests of its insurance program, premium payers, and
participants are better served by plan continuation or plan
termination. While plan continuation is the preferred outcome,
if PBGC believes the plan sponsor will be so weak after exiting
Chapter 11 that it will not survive, PBGC may consider
termination to cut its losses.
1. Distress Termination
Most plan sponsors who seek distress terminations do so in
the context of a bankruptcy proceeding.
a. Liquidation
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy of the plan sponsor, generally
the pension plan terminates. Applying the Liquidation Test is
usually straightforward.319 This assumes, of course, that there
is no member of the sponsor’s controlled group still in business.
If a court in a Chapter 11 case approves a liquidating plan of
reorganization for members of the controlled group, PBGC
318.
319.

See 11 U.S.C. § 1113.
29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
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generally interprets the statutory test the same way as in
Chapter 7 liquidation.
b. Reorganization
As discussed above, a distress termination involving a plan
sponsor seeking to reorganize in bankruptcy requires a
determination by the bankruptcy court.320 At the very least, the
debtor will have to submit declarations and documentary
evidence and perhaps face a contested hearing. All controlled
group members must demonstrate distress, because all
controlled group members are liable for minimum funding
contributions.
In practice, the debtor must show that its projected cash
flow will be inadequate to support projected minimum funding
contributions. The standard has been characterized as a “but
for” test.321 More precisely, the court must determine whether
the debtor “will be unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan
of reorganization and will be unable to continue in business
outside the chapter 11 reorganization process.”322 As one court
explained: “The reference in the statute to ‘a’ plan of
reorganization does not permit a distress termination simply
because a particular plan requires it; rather the test is whether
the debtor can obtain confirmation of any plan of reorganization
without termination of the retirement plan.”323 Relevant factors
include whether the debtor has considered benefit freezes and
other measures to reduce costs, trimmed other fixed costs, and
identified discretionary spending.324
Distress terminations often turn on testimony as to the
feasibility of the debtor’s obtaining exit financing or an equity
infusion if the pension plan were to continue. For example, one
court approved a distress termination after being persuaded that
the debtor would be unable, after debt service, to meet minimum
funding requirements even if it devoted its entire “free cash
flow” to the plan for three years after confirmation. In the
court’s view, it was not plausible that the debtor would attract
post-confirmation financing or an equity investment.325 By
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
In re Resol Mfg. Co., 110 B.R. 858, 861-62 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
In re US Airways Group, 303 B.R. 784, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
See In re US Airways Group, 296 B.R. 734, 745 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
In re Wire Rope Corp., 287 B.R. 771, 780-81 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2002).
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contrast, another court rejected a debtor’s argument that plan
termination was necessary merely because it insisted that a
proposed investor would not close on a transaction if the pension
plan were not terminated.326 After the court considered the
parties’ negotiating history and what it termed “existential
financial realities,” it concluded that “the pension terminations
were not necessary even though they were desired by the
[i]nvestor.”327 In yet another case, where the only investor to
submit a full and credible proposal to invest made termination of
the pension plan a condition of its investment, the bankruptcy
court approved the termination.328
Bankruptcies where a debtor sponsors multiple pension
plans present another wrinkle. Financial projections may show
that the debtor could afford to fund some, but not all, of its
pension plans. A recent controversy concerns whether, in such
cases, the bankruptcy court’s analysis should be based on a planby-plan versus an aggregate approach. PBGC has interpreted
ERISA to require the court to look at the affordability of plans
one by one, that is, not considering the affordability of other
plans. Some courts have disagreed, holding that where a debtor
proposes multiple distress terminations, ERISA and “equitable”
principles of bankruptcy preclude a bankruptcy court from
favoring one group of workers over another by permitting some
plans to be terminated while others continue.329 The legal and
policy questions are deep. As one court acknowledged in ruling
against the agency, “We are not unsympathetic to [PBGC’s]
view. There is undoubtedly a tension between treating similarly
situated workers alike and doing the least that is necessary for
the company to emerge from bankruptcy.”330
2. PBGC-Initiated Termination
Sometimes debtors, especially smaller ones, make no effort

326. Id.
327. In re Philip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802, 808 (2004) (Icahn-affiliated lender
fails to establish grounds for distress termination).
328. In re Aloha Airgroup, Inc., Nos. 04-3063, 1524, 1629, 2005 WL 3487724, *2
(Bankr. D. Haw. Dec. 13, 2005), vacated as moot, Nos. 05-00777 JMS/BMK, 05-00778
JMS/KSC, 05-00778 JMS/KSC, 05-00779 JMS/BMK, 2006 WL 695054 (D. Haw. Mar.
13, 2006).
329. In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006). Accord PBGC v.
Falcon Prods., Inc. (In re Falcon Prods, Inc.), 354 B.R. 889 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d on
other grounds, 497 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2007).
330. Kaiser, 456 F.3d at 342.
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to terminate a plainly unaffordable pension plan. Not only may
the debtor be distracted by more immediate pressures, but
applying for a distress termination requires it to incur more
professional fees. In other instances, a collective bargaining
agreement stands in the way of a distress termination. The
union may resist plan termination as long as possible. The
debtor’s management may either be unwilling to face the facts
about projected funding costs, or may fear a strike or costly court
proceeding to reject its collective bargaining agreement, even
when it recognizes the plan’s unaffordability. In such cases,
where PBGC is persuaded that termination is inevitable, the
agency may initiate termination.331 This procedure is often
carried out by a written agreement between PBGC and the plan
administrator that terminates the plan and appoints the agency
as statutory trustee.332 Termination by agreement takes place
out of court. Moreover, the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement whose terms prohibit the employer from seeking a
distress termination does not bar PBGC from initiating
termination.333 Of course, the plan administrator may decline to
sign a termination agreement with PBGC. If so, the agency files
an action in the appropriate United States district court—not
the bankruptcy court—to seek a decree of plan termination.334
The grounds for PBGC-initiated termination most relevant
to bankruptcy are the following: (1) the plan has failed to meet
the minimum funding standard, (2) the plan will be unable to
pay benefits when due, or (3) PBGC’s long-run loss may
reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably.335 The most
common of these three grounds is the second. One court
interpreted that criterion as follows: “[T]he test is not
affordability, but rather whether the plan will be ‘unable to pay
benefits when due.’ . . .The latter standard encompasses a range
of factors that permit the exercise of discretion by the agency,
whereas the concept of affordability within a § 1341 bankruptcy
proceeding is far more demanding.”336
Although the test of “will be unable to pay benefits when

331. In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan Termination), 468 F.3d 444, 451-52
(7th Cir. 2006).
332. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3); id. § 1342(c)(1)(penultimate sentence).
333. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(3) with 29 U.S.C. § 1342.
334. Id. § 1342(b)(1).
335. Id. § 1342(a)(1), (2), (4).
336. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. PBGC, No. Civ. A. 05-1036ESH, 2006
WL 89829, at 11 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2)).
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due” may be the most often cited rationale for a PBGC-initiated
termination, the alternative “long-run loss” ground can be an
important check against moral hazard.337 For example, PBGC
has successfully terminated plans in advance of a controlledgroup breakup, where a transaction threatened to permit a
financially strong company to escape liability for underfunding
and leave behind a financially troubled sponsor.338 Likewise, the
agency succeeded in terminating plans to prevent additional
losses from springing shutdown benefits agreed upon between
the debtor and its union.339 In another case, the court upheld a
prompt PBGC-initiated termination to prevent six months of
further benefit accruals that would have resulted from a
compromise reached between the debtor and its union in the
context of an inherently unsustainable plan.340 In each example,
the court upheld PBGC action to stop conduct by private-sector
actors that would have harmed the agency and its premium
payers.
D. TREATMENT OF PBGC CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
In a best-case scenario, the debtor reorganizes successfully,
the pension plan continues, and PBGC has no claims in
bankruptcy.
Instead, when the plan terminates, PBGC
vigorously pursues recovery.
1. Unfunded Benefit Liabilities
PBGC’s largest claim is typically its claim for unfunded
benefit liabilities (UBL).341 Under ERISA, if a liable party fails
to pay the claim after demand, then a lien arises in favor of

337. A leading treatise on pension plans explains: “The existence of the U.S.
pension insurance system introduces an element of moral hazard. If pensions are
guaranteed . . . , participants have less incentive to be vigilant in monitoring the
plan. Guarantees of benefit payments . . . also give workers greater incentive to
exchange future promises of pension payments for current wages.” MCGILL, supra
note 59, at 200.
338. PBGC v. FEL Corp., 798 F. Supp. 239 (D.N.J. 1992).
339. PBGC v. Republic Techs. Int’l, LLC, 386 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2004).
340. In re UAL Corp. (Pilots’ Pension Plan Termination), 468 F.3d 444, 451-52
(7th Cir. 2006). The court rejected PBGC’s view that the decision to terminate was
agency action subject to limited review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2012), but upheld the decision on independent review. 468 F.3d at 44952.
341. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b).
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PBGC as of the termination date of the plan.342 The amount of
the lien is limited to 30% of the collective net worth of all liable
parties.343 For purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the lien is
“treated in the same manner as a tax due and owing to the
United States.”344
In practice, the plan sponsor almost
invariably enters bankruptcy before the conditions are met, and
the attachment of a lien—let alone its perfection—is barred by
the automatic stay.345 Thus, the UBL claim is almost always
unsecured.
Somewhat more likely is the possibility that part or all of
the UBL claim may be accorded priority treatment. PBGC’s
position is that the claim is an administrative expense entitled
to priority as a tax incurred by the estate, in an amount up to
30% of the controlled group’s collective net worth.346
Independently, the claim may meet the definition of a “tax” for
bankruptcy purposes because it is an involuntary pecuniary
burden imposed on individuals or their property for public
purposes, which includes the defrayal of the government’s
expenses.347 Alternatively, this claim may be entitled to eighth
priority as a prepetition tax, in an amount up to 30% of the
controlled group’s collective net worth.348 However, there is
contrary authority.349 Any amount held not to be entitled to
priority is asserted as a general unsecured claim.
The issue most often contested involving the UBL claim is
the amount. Debtors and other creditors have challenged
PBGC’s reliance on its regulation defining the amount of the
benefit liabilities.350 The usual argument has been that a
“prudent-investor” interest rate should be used instead of the
regulation’s interest factor in discounting future benefits. Two
courts of appeal have agreed that a prudent-investor approach is
permissible.351 More recently, however, the tide has turned with
342. Id. § 1368(a).
343. Id.
344. Id. § 1368(c)(2).
345. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012).
346. Id. §§ 503(b)(1)(B), 507(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a), (c)(2).
347. New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 287 (1941).
348. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
349. In re Bayly Corp., 163 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 1998), aff’g No. Civ. A. 95 N 901,
90-18983 SBB, 1997 WL 33484011 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 1997) (denying administrative
priority as postpetition tax to part of UBL claim, despite net worth in certain
members of controlled group).
350. 29 C.F.R. §§ 4044.52-.75 (2014).
351. PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir.
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the help of a Supreme Court decision.352 Although not directly
addressing ERISA claims, the Court held that, “Creditors’
entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the
underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s obligation,
subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.”353 In the past decade, PBGC has prevailed
on the issue.354 Other rulings have upheld settlements based on
the regulatory method of defining the UBL amount.355
2. Unpaid Minimum Funding Contributions
Unpaid contributions are usually the second largest claim
PBGC asserts in bankruptcy. Under a tax provision, a lien
enforceable by PBGC may arise for the failure to pay required
contributions in excess of $1 million.356 Occasionally, when the
lien is perfected before bankruptcy, this provision enables PBGC
on behalf of the plan to assert a secured or partly secured claim
for unpaid contributions. The “amount with respect to which a
lien is imposed” is to be treated as taxes due and owing the
United States under rules similar to those prescribed for the lien
for unfunded benefit liabilities.357 Another kind of secured claim
PBGC infrequently asserts is one negotiated with the sponsor
under what is commonly called a “minimum funding waiver” in
certain cases of prebankruptcy business hardship.358
Early in the history of the Bankruptcy Code, one district
court affirmed the decision of a bankruptcy court holding that
the full postpetition contribution was entitled to administrative
priority.359 PBGC was thereby encouraged to believe that courts
would treat the entire amount of unpaid contributions becoming
due after the petition date as an administrative expense. Later
2000); PBGC v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah,
Inc.), 150 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1998).
352. Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
353. Id. at 20.
354. Dugan v. PBGC (In re Rhodes), 382 B.R. 550, 560 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008); In
re High Voltage Eng’g, No. 05-10787, Order at 2 (Bankr. D. Mass. July 26, 2006);
Transcript of Record at 32, In re UAL Corp., No. 02-48191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Dec. 16,
2005); In re US Airways Group, 303 B.R. 784, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).
355. See, e.g., In re Wolverine Proctor & Schwartz, LLC, No. 06-10815-JNF, 2009
WL 1271953 (Bankr. D. Mass. May 5, 2009), aff’d, 436 B.R. 253 (D. Mass. 2010),
aff’d, No. 10-1334 (1st Cir. Apr. 20, 2011).
356. 26 U.S.C. § 430(k)(1), (5) (2012).
357. See id. § 430(k)(4)(C).
358. See id. § 412(c).
359. Columbia Packing Co. v. PBGC, 81 B.R. 205, 208-209 (D. Mass. 1988).
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decisions, however, took a much stricter view and granted
administrative priority to only a small portion (the “normal
cost”) of each contribution that becomes payable postpetition.
Even though under the funding rules of the IRC the entire
amount becomes payable after the petition date, the courts have
generally treated the lion’s share of each contribution as a
prepetition, general unsecured claim.360
The majority view today is that for contributions becoming
due postpetition only the amount considered normal cost is
entitled to treatment as ordinary-course business expenses, and
thus accorded administrative priority.361 Contributions “arising
from services rendered within the 180 days before the date of the
filing of the petition” (or cessation of the debtor’s business if
earlier) are entitled to fifth priority, subject to a cap.362
Consistent with the treatment of postpetition contributions, the
quoted language in the preceding sentence is interpreted to
apply only to normal cost. Any contributions not entitled to
priority are treated as a general unsecured claim.
3. Annual Premiums
Annual premiums—that is, flat-rate and variable-rate—are
usually the smallest PBGC claim in bankruptcy. Probably for
that reason there is a dearth of reported cases on their
treatment.363
In PBGC’s view, unpaid premiums arising
postpetition are entitled to treatment as an administrative
expense.364 Alternatively, this claim may be entitled to eighth
priority as a tax.365 Unpaid premiums arising before the petition

360. PBGC v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus.), 232 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 2000)
(denying tax priority); PBGC v. CF&1 Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF & I
Fabricators of Utah), 150 F.3d 1293, 1297-1300 (10th Cir. 1998) (denying tax priority
and generally denying administrative expense priority); PBGC v. Sunarhauserman,
Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman, Inc.), 126 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir. 1997) (generally
denying administrative expense priority).
361. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2) (2012).
362. Id. § 507(a)(5).
363. See In re Kent Plastics Corp., 183 B.R. 841, 847-48 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995)
(denying administrative priority to postpetition PBGC premiums).
364. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2).
365. See id. § 507(a)(8); New Neighborhoods, Inc. v. W. Virginia Workers' Comp.
Fund, 886 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1989) (treating contributions owed to a workers’
compensation fund as an eighth-priority excise tax). The structure and operation of
state workers’ compensation systems vary widely, so the case law must be carefully
read in assessing the application of such decisions to the treatment of PBGC
premium claims.
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date are treated as a general unsecured claim.
4. Termination Premiums
Generally, a termination premium obligation arises on plan
termination, in addition to any other premium due to the
Corporation.366 That would ordinarily make the termination
premium a dischargeable “claim” in bankruptcy. In such a
circumstance, the termination premium is treated as general
unsecured claim. However, if the plan terminates during “any
bankruptcy reorganization proceeding under [C]hapter 11,” it is
an obligation that springs only on emergence of the reorganized
debtor.367
As the leading case explains, “[A]n employer’s
obligation to pay a Termination Premium on a pension plan that
is terminated during the course of the bankruptcy does not even
arise until the bankruptcy itself is terminated.”368
E. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ISSUES
The debtor’s filing of a proposed disclosure statement is
often a key moment for PBGC to learn the debtor’s intentions
toward its pension plan. Especially in Chapter 11 cases where
PBGC is not a member of the creditors’ committee, the
disclosure statement may be the first time the agency finds out
how the debtor proposes to handle pension issues.
Notwithstanding PBGC’s efforts to focus the debtor’s attention
early on such matters, the disclosure statement—especially in
smaller bankruptcies—is all too often silent on the subject of the
pension plan. If so, PBGC routinely files an objection to the
disclosure statement. In other cases, when the pension plan has
already terminated or the debtor reveals its intent to seek a
distress termination, PBGC may object to a disclosure statement
because it fails adequately to inform creditors of the size of
PBGC’s claims or their proposed treatment under the plan of
reorganization. In practice, such PBGC objections often induce
the debtor to agree to address the omitted topics in an amended
disclosure statement.

366.
367.
368.

29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7) (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 101(5); PBGC v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2009).
Oneida, 562 F.3d at 157.
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F. PLAN OF REORGANIZATION ISSUES
1. Prepackaged Plans
A prepackaged Chapter 11 plan is a bankruptcy plan of
reorganization that has been negotiated and accepted by
creditors before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Prepetition
solicitation and voting is permitted under the Bankruptcy
Code.369 A prepackaged plan differs from the typical plan under
Chapter 11 in that the sequence of events is altered to move up
the bargaining, solicitation of support, and submission of
acceptances or rejections. Once the bankruptcy proceeding has
commenced, then the debtor may move immediately for a
hearing to confirm the plan. There is no requirement for a
disclosure statement because the debtor already has enough
votes to seek plan confirmation.370
Unless PBGC somehow has advance notice (for example, if
the debtor needed PBGC’s acceptance to obtain the necessary
votes for approval), then the debtor may schedule a confirmation
hearing before PBGC receives notice of the bankruptcy. This
may occur, for example, because PBGC’s name was omitted from
the debtor’s list of creditors entitled to notice. In such a case, the
agency must take immediate action to gather information and to
analyze whether the prepackaged plan may prejudice PBGC.
For example, the prepackaged plan might result in the debtor’s
abandoning the pension plan as the debtor heads toward
liquidation,371 or PBGC’s expected recovery in a hypothetical
future plan termination might be reduced. In some prepackaged
plans, the debtor intends to continue the plan’s pension plan and
there is no such prejudice. As in other cases where the pension
plan is proposed to remain ongoing with the reorganized debtor,
the agency may nevertheless seek to negotiate protective
language in the reorganization plan and confirmation order,
specifying that pension liabilities are not being discharged or
otherwise altered.
2. Executory Contracts
Occasionally a debtor will try to “reject” its pension plan as
369.
370.
2013).
371.

11 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (g).
Id. § 1125(g); JOAN N. FEENEY, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 11:46 (5th ed.
See supra Part III A. 2., at 292-293 (discussing the Friendly Ice Cream case).
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an executory contract. PBGC routinely objects to such attempts,
because Title IV of ERISA is the exclusive means of terminating
a pension plan.372 The legislative history of ERISA and current
case law fail to support such a tactic.373
3. Classification
The Bankruptcy Code provides little guidance on claim
classification beyond the general requirement that a plan may
place a claim in a particular class only if it is “substantially
similar” to other claims therein.374 Unfairly applied, separate
classification of similar claims in a plan of reorganization can be
a tool to gerrymander voting or to give a greater recovery to
some general unsecured claims at the expense of others.
Because PBGC’s claims are often the largest in a bankruptcy,
the agency may be perceived by employees, trade creditors, or
note holders as a less-deserving governmental creditor. Thus,
there are sometimes attempts to place the claims of PBGC or
other unpopular general unsecured creditors in a separate class.
PBGC will object to a proposed plan of reorganization where it
discerns the motive or effect of such treatment to be improper.
The subject of abusive claim classification is largely governed by
evolving case law.375 Fortunately, PBGC has encountered fewer
attempts to manipulate classification in recent years.
4. Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy whereby
the assets and liabilities of two or more debtors are consolidated.
The upshot is that multiple debtors are treated as a single
debtor for purposes of distribution.376
The standard for
permitting substantive consolidation varies from circuit to
circuit, but there are two general approaches.377 According to

372. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2012).
373. 1 Legislative History of the Comprehensive Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 83, 289 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
756, 940; In re Philip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802, 808 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
374. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).
375. See generally 6 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 109:4 (discussing trends in
interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012)).
376. See generally 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at §§ 21:3-4 (citing bankruptcy
court’s authority to exercise general equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
(2012)).
377. 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 21:4.
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one approach, “The proponent must show not only a substantial
identity between the entities to be consolidated, but also that
consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or to realize some
benefit.”378 The second approach calls for the court to determine
the following: “(i) whether creditors dealt with the entities as a
single economic unit and ‘did not rely on their separate identity
in extending credit,’ . . . or (ii) whether the affairs of the debtors
are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”379
If members of the plan sponsor’s controlled group are also in
bankruptcy, often the great majority of claims are against the
sponsor, which is usually the principal operating company. By
contrast, PBGC is often the only significant creditor against
other debtors, by virtue of its joint and several claims.
Assuming the pension plan terminates and some debtors in the
controlled group have significant unencumbered assets,
substantive consolidation can severely harm PBGC by effectively
eliminating its joint and several claims and diluting its recovery.
Absent strong evidence that the requirements for applying this
remedy are met, PBGC will generally oppose a motion or plan of
reorganization calling for substantive consolidation. Unlike
abuses of classification, ill-founded requests for substantive
consolidation are as serious a threat to the agency’s interests
today as ever.
5. Feasibility
Before confirming a plan of reorganization, the bankruptcy
court must find that the plan “is not likely to be followed by the
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of
the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless
such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.”380
Disputes over feasibility can take many forms.
One
troubling scenario for PBGC is where the debtor proposes to
continue the pension plan, but under a proposed reorganization
plan that poses a risk that the sponsor will be unable to fund its
pension obligations upon emergence from bankruptcy. If PBGC
concludes that the debtor’s financial projections are unrealistic,
it may object to the reorganization plan on the ground of
378. Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
379. Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking
Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988).
380. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2012).
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feasibility. A different kind of feasibility issue may arise where
the necessity for plan termination is undisputed. For example,
PBGC may object to the proposed reorganization plan if it
concludes that its claims cannot be paid in accordance with the
bankruptcy priority rules.381
6. Third-party Releases
As part of a plan of reorganization, debtors sometimes ask
the bankruptcy court to approve releases from liability for
nondebtors. The Bankruptcy Code generally provides that
“discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such
debt.” 382 However, a substantial majority of courts have held
that this provision does not negate a court’s power to confirm
plans that contain such provisions, especially if the confirmation
order enjoins collection activity against certain nondebtors who
are necessary to the successful reorganization of the debtor or if
the releases are consensual.383
PBGC has learned to be vigilant about the use of broad
language in third-party releases, which may shield fiduciaries of
pension plans from liability for possible misconduct, or other
parties with pension obligations. Whether or not the pension
plan terminates during bankruptcy, evidence of a fiduciary
breach may not be discovered until after confirmation.384 In
either case, it is important to preserve potential claims on behalf
of the plan against wrongdoers. When overly expansive release
language is proposed, PBGC generally objects. Not only does
such language run afoul of the Bankruptcy Code’s limitation of
the effect of discharge, but ERISA provides that “any provision
of an agreement or instrument that purports to relieve a
fiduciary from responsibility or liability” to an employee benefit
plan is “void as against public policy.”385 Finally, broadly
drafted releases of third parties may shield nondebtors who are
part of the debtor’s controlled group and otherwise subject to
PBGC’s joint and several claims. In practice, such objections are
usually resolved consensually when the debtor agrees to carve

381. Id. § 507(a).
382. Id. § 524(e).
383. See generally 6 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 114:4; 2 ROBERT E. GINSBERG
& ROBERT D. MARTIN, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY § 13.16 (5th ed. 2014).
384. Id.
385. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2012).
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out such potential claims from the terms of the release
provisions.
7. Asset Sales
The debtor, after notice and a hearing, may generally “use,
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate.”386 Where the debtor proposes to sell
substantially all its assets, most courts consider a list of factors
to determine whether the debtor has shown a “good business
reason” to justify such a transaction.387 In recent years investors
in bankrupt companies increasingly prefer to structure
transactions as a purchase of assets, rather than a purchase of
stock.388 If the buyer does not agree to assume the pension plan
as part of the transaction, the sale of all or substantially all the
debtor’s assets may result in abandonment of the pension plan
with the debtor, which is left behind as a shell company.
Instead of renegotiating contracts and other obligations of
the debtor under the formalities of a plan of reorganization, a
motion for sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets may
permit major issues affecting creditors, including the future of
the pension plan, to be effectively decided with relatively few
procedural safeguards. For that reason, PBGC and other
creditors may object to such a motion on the ground that it
amounts to what is often termed a sub rosa, or under-the-table,
plan of reorganization.389 Among the dangers posed by such a
sale is the lack of sufficient disclosure for parties to determine
whether the transaction is at arm’s length or represents the
highest and best offer. If the buyer does not propose to assume
the pension plan, then the court is not required to make a
finding as to whether the plan is affordable. Often there is too
little time for PBGC and employee groups to negotiate with the
buyer to assume the plan or to explore whether another form of
restructuring might permit the plan to survive.
386. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).
387. See 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 44:17 (citing Comm. Of Equity Sec.
Holders v. Lionell Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (as the
leading case).
388. Gotbaum Statement, supra note 307, at 3 (section 363 sales of all or
substantially all assets in large, public company bankruptcies, as a percentage of all
cases disposed, by year of case disposition, grew from 4% during 1990s to 21% since
2000).
389. See 2 NORTON, supra note 229, at § 44:17; see also In re Braniff Airways,
Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983) (seminal case involving a PBGC objection).
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V.

CONCLUSION

PBGC-insured pension plans protect more than 40 million
people. For decades, PBGC has sought to promote continuation
of pension plans by sponsors who file for bankruptcy
reorganization under Chapter 11. In bankruptcy, PBGC wins a
case whenever the debtor keeps its pension plan.

